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Abstract 
In a developing country, such as Saudi Arabia, which depends on real time information, investigating voluntary 
disclosure is crucial for the capital market efficiency and shareholders satisfactory. A firm’s voluntary disclosure 
is important to reduce the level of information asymmetry and increase the firm’s credibility in the capital market. 
This study reports on voluntary disclosure practices of Saudi non-financial publicly traded companies listed in 
the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) during the period 2012-2013, and relates the extent of disclosure to : 
corporation size, auditor size, leverage, profitability, and listing age. A disclosure index has been developed and 
statistical analysis is performed using multiple regression analysis. Voluntary disclosure varies widely within a 
sample of 116 non-financial publicly traded companies during the period covered. The findings indicated that 
firms, on average, report 0.29 percent of the voluntary information. Further, in an effort to examine the 
relationship between the voluntary disclosure level and firm specific characteristics, the results of the regression 
analyses indicated that corporation size, profitability, and listing age have significant positive association with 
voluntary disclosure level in annual reports, however, auditor size and leverage do not have any significant 
association with voluntary disclosure level. 
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure; Annual Reports; Saudi Arabia 
 
1. Introduction 
Several theories have been used by earlier researchers to explain why firms are engaged in disclosing 
information voluntarily, and the most frequently used one is agency theory (Hossain et al., 1995; Watson et al., 
2002; Marston, 2003; Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2009). An 
agency theory states that a rational agents (managers) will act for their own interest, and  not for their 
shareholders' interests. This type of management behavior occurs because they have more  complete information 
about a company, than the owners (Jensen et al., 1976). This  behavior leads to a lack of transparent disclosure to 
shareholders. Financial disclosure plays an effective corporate  governance role, by providing transparent 
information to both shareholders and other stakeholders. Makhija et al. (2004) stated that the extent and quality 
of voluntary financial disclosure is an outcome of conflicting interests, among management, majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Agency costs are incurred resulting from the conflict of interests and 
information asymmetry between owners and managers. Thus, managers are expected to disclose more 
information to reduce agency costs.  
Developing markets have higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Gul et al, 
2004; Chau et al., 2010), and have lower level of disclosure than those in developed market economies (Salter, 
1998; Tower et al., 2011; and Wang et al., 2008). Voluntary disclosure is regarded as an external mechanism for 
the control of the leaders, a protection of the shareholders, and a decrease of the agency costs resulting from the 
asymmetry of information between the agents and the shareholders (Wang et al., 2008). 
Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports is one of the most rapidly growing research areas in the 
accounting field. Saudi capital market authority (CMA) as well as other stock market regulators around the globe 
require public companies to disclose financial information on an annual basis, which is typically achieved 
through the publication of their annual reports. The financial disclosed information contained in the annual 
reports is subject to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Over the years, several companies 
have found it worthy to disclose information over and above what is mandatorily required by GAAP, 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Saudi capital market authority (CMA), or all. Voluntary 
disclosure of financial information could be thus seen as giving the reader of an annual report, additional tools to 
more understand the company financial and non financial information.  
Voluntary disclosure refers to additional information delivered by firms beside the mandatory 
information. Voluntary disclosure is defined as the information primarily outside the financial statements that is 
not explicitly required by accounting rules or standards (FASB, 2001). Meek et al. (1995) define voluntary 
disclosures as the disclosures made in excess of requirements. They represent free choices on the part of 
company management to provide information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual 
reports. Disclosure increase transparency while market transparency is observed as a fundamental mechanism in 
order to decrease the information asymmetry among the market's participants (Bleck et al., 2007).  
Complete disclosure indicating the present of all information in a way that financial statement show 
complete picture concerning events and transactions of business enterprise. There are both advantages and 
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disadvantages of disclosing voluntary financial statements. While Chan and Gray (2002) found that voluntary 
disclosure reduces conflicts of interest in public companies, Mack et al. (1995) discovered that disclosing 
voluntary information decreases competitive advantage. Mack et al. (1995) defined voluntary disclosures into 
strategic, non-financial and financial information, however, The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
classified voluntary disclosures into Business Data, Analysis of Business Data, Forward-Looking Information, 
Information about Management and Shareholders, Company Background, and Information about Intangible 
Assets.  
This paper investigates on voluntary financial disclosure practices of Saudi corporations and relates the 
extent of disclosure to corporation size, external auditor size, profitability, and listing age. This study is 
motivated by a unique information environment and a growing capital market, Saudi Arabia, which differs from 
those of developed countries in the fact that emerging markets have high-growth potential, relatively weak 
regulatory environment, weak corporate governance leading to expropriation of minority shareholders, and low 
information disclosure level causing high information gap between companies and investors. Alsaeed (2006) 
indicated that research studies about these markets are needed and are vital in improving the weak transparency 
and disclosure situation by attracting the attention of regulatory bodies and firm managers. This study also 
contributes to the recent literature on the information transparency and accountability.  
It is also motivated to acknowledge that agency theory has been used for some time to explain 
companies' voluntary disclosure of corporate social and environmental performance in Western countries (Gul et 
al., 2004; Chau et al., 2010; Jensen et al., 1976; Makhija et al., 2004; Salter, 1998; Tower et al., 2011; And Wang 
et al., 2008). This study extends these theories to an emerging but important economy, namely Saudi Arabia, 
aiming to explain corporate disclosure behavior changes in the context of a very different disclosure environment. 
This environment features newly imposed corporate governance regulations as a direct consequence of the 
economic reforms in Saudi Arabia. As corporate disclosure develops into a more significant issue in investors' 
decision making in the Saudi stock market (Tadawul), this research  highlights the need for further investigation 
into the voluntary disclosure practices in Saudi publicly traded companies and relates the extent of disclosure to 
firm size, external auditor size, profitability, and firm’s age. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature review and 
development of hypothesis. Section three describes the methodology, and the data collection. Section four 
reports the empirical results and the robustness checks. Finally, section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the literature, a number of studies have been undertaken to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure (Mack et al., 1995; Gelb, 2000; Ho et al., 2001; Haniffa et al., 
2002; Chau et al., 2002; Eng et al., 2003; Makhija et al., 2004; Millar et al., 2005; Barako, et al, 2006; Aljifri, 
2008; Alves et al., 2012). Corporate governance mechanisms, examined in these studies, include ownership 
structure, board composition, and the audit committee characteristics. Ho et al. (2001) examined the relationship 
between four major corporate governance mechanisms and the extent of voluntary disclosures in Hong Kong. 
The results showed that the existence of an audit committee, is significantly and positively related to the extent 
of voluntary disclosure, while the percentage of family members on the board, is negatively related to the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. Mack et al. (1995) found that the extent and type of voluntary disclosure differ by 
geographic region, industry and company size. Eng et al. (2003) found that firms corporate governance structure 
and ownership structure affects the extent of voluntary disclosures.  
Emerging markets have become the focus of many researchers, international corporations, personal and 
institutional investors due to their high rates of economic growth (Millar et al., 2005). Gelb (2000) found a 
negative association between insiders‟ ownership and disclosure quality, also he found that the quality of annual 
reports increases when the ownership is less concentrated. Haniffa et al. (2002) examined the relationship 
between various corporate governance variables, cultural and firm specific factors and the extent of voluntary 
disclosures in Malaysia. Their results showed that ownership diffusion is significantly positively related to the 
extent of voluntary disclosures. Chau et al. (2002) examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. Their results showed that the extent of outside ownership is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure and the “insider” or family ownership is negatively associated 
with voluntary disclosure. 
Eng et al. (2003) examined the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosures in 
Singapore. Their results showed a significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and the level 
of voluntary disclosure, and a significant positive relationship between government ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. Makhija et al. (2004) examined the impact of ownership structure, on the extent of voluntary 
financial disclosure by Czech firms. They found that the extent of disclosure is positively related to investment 
fund ownership, at low levels of fund ownership but is negatively related to investment fund ownership at high 
levels of ownership. Barako, et al, (2006) examined the association between various corporate governance 
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variables and voluntary corporate disclosure in Kenya. The results showed that the existence of an audit 
committee, foreign ownership, institutional ownership, firm size and leverage, have a significant positive 
relationship with the level of voluntary disclosures, and the shareholder concentration showed a significant 
negative relationship with voluntary disclosures.  
Aljifri (2008) examined the extent of disclosure in annual reports of 31 listed firms in the UAE and also 
determined the underlying factors that affect the level of disclosures. The study hypothesized that four main 
factors would affect the extent of disclosure in the UAE, namely, the sector type (banks, insurance, industrial, 
and service), size (assets), debt–equity ratio, and profitability. Findings indicated that significant differences 
were found among sectors; however, the size, the debt–equity ratio, and the profitability were found to have 
insignificant association with the level of disclosure. Nazli et al. (2007) examined the influence of ownership 
structure on corporate social responsibility disclosure in Malaysia. Their results showed that, companies in 
which the directors hold a higher proportion of equity shares disclosed significantly less information, while 
companies in which the government is a substantial shareholder, disclosed significantly more information. 
Donnelly et al. (2008) reported clear evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of 
nonexecutive directors on the board. Firms that have a nonexecutive chairman make greater voluntary 
disclosures than other firms. Also, their results showed there is no association between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and ownership structure. Samaha et al. (2012), examined the impact of a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance attributes on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. Their 
results showed that the extent of governance disclosure is lower for companies with duality in position and 
higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership and increases with the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and also firm size. Alves et al. (2012), examined the relations between 
corporate governance variables and voluntary disclosure in Portugal and Spain. Their results indicated that the 
main determinants of voluntary disclosure are firm size, growth opportunities, organizational performance, board 
compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. 
Alsaeed (2006) studied the association between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. A total of 20 voluntary items developed to assess the level of disclosure in the annual reports of 40 firms. 
The results showed that the mean of the disclosure index was lower than average. It was also found that firm size 
was significantly positively associated with the level of disclosure however, debt, ownership dispersion, age, 
profit margin, industry and audit firm size were found to be insignificant in explaining the variation of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Giving the abovementioned literature and the crucial role of voluntary corporate reporting policy, it is clear that a 
considerable research has been developed in order to identify factors that have the potential of affecting 
corporate voluntary disclosure practices in both developing and developed markets. Although many factors have 
been identifies, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. The study is based on the investigation of the corporate 
voluntary disclosure by 121 publicly traded companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), using a 
disclosure checklist issued by the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA). A quantitative analysis is then used to 
test the relationship between corporate characteristics and disclosure level. The study found that firms, on 
average, report 0.29 percent of the voluntary information. The low disclosure level most likely relates to the fact 
that this type of information is voluntary in nature, and no existing disciplines set out by the authoritative 
accounting and reporting bodies in Saudi Arabia require public firms to display such information. In other words, 
voluntary disclosure is left to the discretion of management. Further, in an effort to examine the relationship 
between the voluntary disclosure level and firm specific characteristics, the results of univariate and multivariate 
analyses indicated that corporation size, profitability, and listing age have significant positive association with 
voluntary disclosure level in annual reports. On the other hand, auditor size and leverage do not have any 
significant association with voluntary disclosure level. 
 
3-1. Corporation Size 
In the literature, the company size has been considered as an important determinant of disclosure level (e.g., 
Lang et al., 2000; Wallace et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Hossain et al., 2007; Belkaoui-Riahi, 2001; Chow et al., 
1987; Lang et al., 1993; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), and there is a general agreement that a positive relationship 
between the size of a firm and its extent of disclosure, is to be expected. This association can be explained by 
agency theory, which proposes that big firms have higher agency costs than small firms (Jensen et al., 1976). 
Marston et al. (2004) found that higher level of disclosure is expected to decrease agency cost which may arise 
from the conflicting interests of shareholders and managers. In order to reduce this agency cost, big firms adopt 
more extensive and comprehensive disclosures. It can also be assumed that large firms are more sensitive to 
political costs and, consequently, will disclose more in order to allay public criticism, or government intervention, 
in their affairs. Therefore, in this research it is hypothesized that.  
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Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between the size of the firm and the extent of  voluntary disclosure 
in the Saudi publicly traded corporations. 
 
3-2. Leverage 
Leverage describes a company’s financial structure, and measures the long term risk implied by that structure 
(Watson et al., 2002). Previous studies have largely used agency theory to explain the relationship between 
leverage and corporate disclosure (Hossain et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Watson et al., 2002; Alsaeed, 2006; 
Abdullah et al., 2008). Companies with high leverage need to disclose detailed information to the stakeholders. 
They need to disclose their capabilities to pay debts. The agency theory has been used by previous researches to 
argue that potential transfers of wealth from debtholders to stockholders, can take place in highly leverage firms. 
Therefore, agency theory suggests that the level of information disclosure increases as the leverage of the firm 
grows. Ahmad et al. (1994) argued that in countries where financial institutions are a primary source of company 
funds, there is an expectation that companies, which have large sums of debt on their balance sheet, will disclose 
more information in their annual reports. While some studies in the literature found a positive significant 
association between leverage and voluntary disclosure (Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al., 1995), other studies 
have proved no significant association between leverage and the level of voluntary disclosure (Wallace et al., 
1994; Inchausti, 1997; Ho et al., 2001; Aksu et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang et al., 2007; Chau et al., 2010). 
In contrast, surprisingly, Eng et al. (2003) found a negative significant association. Although the abovementioned 
literature was inconsistent about the relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure, it is argued that 
financial institutions in Saudi Arabia play an active part in the provision of funds to borrowers. Therefore, in this 
study the following hypothesis is developed. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between leverage and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
Saudi publicly traded corporations. 
 
3-3. Auditor Size 
Researchers in the literature have investigated the association between auditor size and the voluntary disclosure 
level in a verity of corporations around the globe (Wang et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 1994; and Bonsón et al., 
2006). Many of them hypothesized that there is a positive association between audit firm size and disclosure 
level. The explanation for such positive association between auditor size and voluntary disclosure is that Big-4 
audit firms have greater experience since they are international, and they do not just audit annual reports and 
accounts, but also influence them (Wallace et al., 1994). Auditing firms may use the information disclosed by 
their clients as a means the corporations overall quality (Inchausti, 1997). Furthermore, they are more concerned 
with their reputation and, therefore, require higher disclosure from their clients (Alsaeed, 2006). Hence, clients 
of Big-4 audit firms are expected to disclose higher levels of information. Although some studies found 
significant positive association between auditor size and the level of voluntary disclosure (Singhvi et al., 1971; 
Inchausti, 1997; Patton et al., 1997; Uyar, 2011; Raffournier, 1995; and Bonsón et al., 2006), a number of other 
studies failed to discover a significant relationship between the auditor size and disclosure level (Wallace et al., 
1994; Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang et al., 2007; Chau et al., 2010). Thus, the following hypothesis has been 
developed: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between auditor size and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
Saudi publicly traded corporations. 
 
3-4. Profitability 
Agency theory suggests that managers of profitable firms tend to disclose more information to support the 
continuance of their positions and compensation arrangements (Inchausti, 1997). Profitable companies are 
considered to be in good condition and have incentives to distinguish themselves from less profitable companies, 
in order to raise capital on the best available terms. Therefore, profitable companies voluntarily tend to show 
more detailed disclosures to advertise their various activities and they, can be expected to disclose more 
information than less-profitable companies. The empirical literature, however, is mixed. Haniffa et al. (2002), 
and Gul et al. (2004) found positive significant association, whereas Ho et al. (2001), Alsaeed (2006), Hossain et 
al. (2009), Wallace et al. (1994), Inchausti (1997), and Chau et al. (2010) found no significant association. In 
view of the abovementioned findings, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
Saudi publicly traded corporations. 
 
3-5. Listing Age 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) explains why the extent of a company’s information disclosure may be influenced by its 
age. He mentions three factors in this regard: younger companies may suffer competitive disadvantage; gathering, 
processing and disseminating information may be more costly and onerous for younger firms; younger 
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companies may lack a ‘track record’ on which they can rely for public disclosure. Several previous studies used 
firm age variable. While Hossain et al. (2009) found positive significant association between firm age and 
disclosure level, Alsaeed (2006), Hossain et al. (2007) and Haniffa et al. (2002) found no significant association. 
Therefore, there is no agreement in the literature about the relationship between the listing age and voluntary 
disclosure and it is clear that there is not much empirical evidence pertaining to this variable. This variable 
though is to be adopted in this study as well. Listing age is the length of time a company has been listed on a 
capital market, and it may be relevant in explaining the voluntary disclosure level (Haniffa et al., 2002). 
Haniffaet al. (2002) investigated the association between listing age and the extent of voluntary disclosure, and 
found no significant association between the two variables. Thus, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive association between listing age and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
Saudi publicly traded corporations. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Sample 
The corporations included in this research were selected from the entire list of companies that traded on the 
Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange Market (Tadawul). The sample of this study consists of 116 Saudi companies, out 
of 161 listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange in years 2012 and 2013. These firms represent more than 72% of all 
publicly traded corporations listed in the Saudi Arabian Stock Market (Tadawul). Table (1) illustrates the number 
and the percentage of our sample firms by industry. Following the majority of voluntary disclosure literature (e.g. 
Wallace et al., 1995; Haniffa et al., 2002; and Ghazali et al., 2006) financial companies; e.g. banks, insurance 
companies, and leasing companies; were excluded from the sample due to the different requirements of 
disclosure and corporate governance. Hence their annual reports may be not comparable to those of other 
companies. Therefore, this research excludes banks and insurance companies due to their specific disclosure 
requirements by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and because their business activities and financial 
reports are not comparable with those of firms in other industries. A few other firms were also excluded, as some 
required data are lacking. Appendix A presents the list of the selected sample. 
Table (1). Sample description 
Names of firms Number of firms Percentage 
Petrochemical industries 14 12.93 
Cement 13 11.50 
Retail 13 11.50 
Energy & Utilities 2 1.77 
Agriculture and food industries 15 13.27 
Telecommunications & Information 
Technology 
3 2.65 
Multi-investment 6 12.39 
Building & Construction 15 13.27 
Real estate development 8 7.08 
Transport 4 3.54 
Media and Publishing 3 2.65 
Hotel and Transport 3 2.65 
 
The period under study is from 2012 to 2013. Just like Kolsi (2012), the author uses only two years 
because we are interested in the cross-sectional determinants of the voluntary disclosure practice. The disclosure 
level information and the data of its determinants was collected for each firm from the annual reports and 
Tadawul database. The data on corporate governance are collected from the corporate governance regulations, 
available on the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) database. 
The data for measuring the dependent and independent variables, investigated in this study were 
manually collected from the sampled companies annual reports that were downloaded from the companies 
official websites or from the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange Market (Tadawul). The data was analyzed through 
the use of bivariate correlation and multiple linear regression analysis, using SPSS software. Consistent with 
prior studies, ordinary least-squares regression is used to examine the relationship between the variables and the 
extent of voluntary information disclosure, by Saudi Arabian listed firms. 
 
4.2. Model Development 
The explanations of dependent and independent variables are presented in Table (2). Most measurements and 
expected relationships are consistent with prior research (Cooke, 1989; Gul et al., 2004; and Hossain et al., 2009). 
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Table (2): Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Variable  Indicators Explanation Expected 
signs 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
 
DSCLSRE 
(1) if a firm discloses an item, and (0) if it does 
not. For each firm, a disclosure index was 
computed as the ratio of the actual score given to 
the firm divided by the maximum score. 
 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
s 
Corporation 
Size 
CSIZE 
Measured by Log of the book value of total 
assets 
+ 
Leverage LEV 
Measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets 
+ 
Auditor Size 
 
ASIZE 
(1) if the auditor is a Big-4 auditing firms, (0) if 
not 
+ 
Profitability 
 
PROF 
Measured by return on assets (that is, net 
income/total assets). 
+ 
Listing Age LAGE Measured by Log of the age of firm. + 
 
In order to examine the relationship between independent variables and the extent of voluntary 
information disclosures of Saudi Arabian publicly traded companies listed in the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul), the following multiple regression is estimated using corporation size, leverage, auditor size, 
profitability, and listing age as independent variables and voluntary disclosure as the dependent variable.  
DSCLSRE = β0 + β1 CSIZE + β2 LEV + β3 ASIZE + β4 PROF + β5 LAGE +  
Where:  
DSCLSRE = extent of voluntary disclosure scores; CSIZE = Corporation Size; LEV = Leverage; ASIZE = 
Auditor Size; PROF = Profitability; LAGE = Listing Age; and  = error term. 
 
4.3. Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Researchers in the literature have mostly designed disclosure check lists to collect voluntary disclosure data. 
Hossain et al. (2009) stated that selection of voluntary disclosure items is a subjective judgment depending on 
the nature and context of the industry and country context. However, the consistency in many disclosure items 
can be realized across previous studies when checklists examined. The disclosure index of this study, however, 
was constructed based on the Corporate Governance Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by the 
Board of Capital Market Authority (CMA) pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006, dated 21/10/1427AH 
(corresponding to 12/11/2006) based on the Saudi Capital Market Law issued by the Saudi Royal Decree No. 
M/30 dated 2/6/1424AH (corresponding to 30/2/2003), amended by Resolution of the Board of the Capital 
Market Authority Number 1-10-2010 dated 30/3/1431AH (corresponding to 16/3/2010) (CMA, 2003).  
To validate the study’s voluntary disclosure index, we adopted the method implemented by Botosan 
(1997). He used the following points to validate his index: comparison with similar studies using voluntary 
disclosure indexes; positive statistically significant correlations between the number of analysts and the 
voluntary disclosure scores; an accepted value for the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient; and similar results with 
previous studies of the correlation between the voluntary disclosure level and firm characteristics. The Index, 
therefore, was then compared to a wide range of recent studies from various countries (Aksu et al., 2006; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain et al., 2007; Huafang et al., 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Haat et al., 2008; Hossain et al., 
2009; Chau et al., 2010; Depoers et al., 2010; Lopes et al., 2010; Mun et al., 2011) to make sure that this research 
covers most of the items in the said literature and the points used by Botosan (1997) were also checked. The 
Index is reported in Appendix (B). 
The disclosure level of a company was calculated by dichotomous procedure which assigns a score of 
(1) if a corporation discloses an item and a score of (0) if it does not (Cooke, 1989; Gul et al., 2004; and Hossain 
et al., 2009). For each firm, a disclosure index was computed as the ratio of the actual score given to the firm 
divided by the maximum score. Accordingly, the voluntary disclosure index for each company was calculated as 
follows (Cooke, 1989; Hossain et al., 2007;and Hossain et al., 2009): 
 
Number of items disclosed voluntarily by a given firm
Voluntary disclosure index = 
Total number of relevant itemsthat should be disclosed  
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5. Results discussion 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table (3) provides the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the independent and dependents 
variables in this study. The table shows that the level of average voluntary disclosure in the 116 sampled Saudi 
publicly traded companies is 29% with a minimum of 21% and a maximum of 42%. Comparing these results 
with the related literature, we can say that our results are consistent with Alturki (2014) in Saudi Arabia (21%); 
Leventis et al. (2004) in Greece (37%); Al-Shammari (2008) in Kuwait (46%); Ghazali et al. (2006) in Malaysia 
(31%); and Hossain et al. (2009) in Qatar (37%). The low amount of voluntary information disclosed in the body 
of financial reports could be interpreted by the fact that this type of information is voluntary in nature, and 
capital market authorities normally do not regulate not enforce voluntary disclosure.   
Table (3). Descriptive statistics for study variables 
Variable  Indicators Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
DSCLSRE 0.29 0.42 0.21 0.14 
Corporation Size CSIZE 24.50 27.61 16.08 1.47 
Leverage LEV 0.77 5.96 0.012 0.36 
Auditor Size ASIZE 0.06 1.0 0.0 0.43 
Profitability PROF 1.77 4.52 1.47 2.83 
Listing Age LAGE 0.15 0.44 0.001 0.03 
 
The results also shows that only (6%) of the 116 sampled Saudi publicly traded companies are audited by the big 
4 audit firms. Profitability has 1.47 and 4.52 as minimum and maximum value respectively, mean value 1.77 and 
standard deviation 2.83. The mean for corporation size is 24.5 and the mean of leverage ratio is about 77 %, 
suggesting that the sample firms are highly leveraged. The last independent variable, listing age of firm has 
0.001 and 0.44 as minimum and maximum value respectively, mean value 0.15 and standard deviation 0.03. 
  
5.2. Correlation matrix and multi-collinearity analysis 
Table (4) displays the Pearson correlation among each pair of independent variables. Following Weisberg (1985), 
Al-Shammari (2008), and Hossain et al. (2009), multi-collinearity in explanatory variables has been diagnosed 
through analyses of correlation factors and Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) and the correlations between 
explanatory variables is accepted if they are not harmful in multivariate unless they exceed 0.80 (Bryman et al., 
1997). As shown, table (4) suggests that the multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables is unlikely to 
pose a serious problem in interpreting the results of our various estimations. 
Table (4). Correlation Matrix 
VARIABLES DSCLSRE CSIZE LEV ASIZE PROF LAGE 
DSCLSRE 1.00      
CSIZE - 0.03 1.00     
LEV 0.21 - 0.03 1.00    
ASIZE 0.17 0.01 - 0.47 1.00   
PROF - 0.12 0.01 - 0.03 - 0.12 1.00  
LAGE 0.02 0.06 - 0.11 - 0.01 0.03 1.00 
 
The further confirmation of multi-collinearity is checked by variance inflation factor (VIF). The (VIF) 
in excess of 10 should be considered an indication of harmful multi-collinearity (Neter et al., 1989). Alternatively, 
if the average VIF is substantially greater than 1 then the regression may be biased (Bowerman et al., 1990). 
Table (4) shows that the average VIF (1.68) is close to 1 and this confirms that collinearity is not a problem for 
this model.  
 
5.3. Multivariate and Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis has been widely used in the literature to investigate the association between the voluntary 
disclosure level in annual reports and firm characteristics. The results of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression are shown in Table (5). The regression results shown in Table (5) above shows that the F-value is 
11.670 and the P-value is 0.000. The result statistically supports the model significance. The value obtained for 
the adjusted coefficient of determination R-square of the model was 0.5927. This tells us how much of the 
variance in the dependent variable (total voluntary disclosure index) is explained by the model. Given these 
results, the study concludes that the variables considered in the model largely explain the voluntary disclosure of 
the 116 Saudi publicly traded companies listed in Tadawul. 
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Table (5). Regression results 
DSCLSRE = β0 + β1 CSIZE + β2 LEV + β3 ASIZE + β4 PROF + β5 LAGE +  
Where:  
DSCLSRE = extent of voluntary disclosure (Dependent Variable); CSIZE = Corporation Size; LEV = 
Leverage; ASIZE = Auditor Size; PROF = Profitability; LAGE = Listing Age; and  = error term. 
 
Variable β t-value Sig. VIF 
Constant -3.458 -2.721 0.000  
CSIZE 1.527 2.356 0.037 1.18 
LEV -1.721 -5.154 0.127 1.37 
ASIZE 0.183 0.519 0.328 1.63 
PROF 0.728 0.729 0.033 1.56 
LAGE 0.527 1.966 0.052 1.11 
Model Summary 
R  0.6851 
R-square  0.5927 
Adjusted R-square  0.4837 
F-value  11.670 
Sig.  0.000 
P-value  (0.000) 
Significant at .05% 
 
The first hypothesis in this study stating that there is a positive association between the size of the firm 
and the extent of  voluntary disclosure in the Saudi publicly traded corporations is obviously supported by the 
above results. Table (5) indicates a significant and positive relation between corporations’ size and voluntary 
disclosure. This results is consistent with other studies in the literature (Cooke, 1989; Meek et al., 1995; Hossain 
et al., 1995; Camfferman et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2008; and Alturki, 2014) suggesting that larger companies 
disclose more information, either mandatory or voluntary, than smaller companies. The argument rely on the fact 
large firms tend to have more voluntary disclosure because larger firms have more agency costs and a wider 
ownership distribution, so they are obliged to disclose more information. This positive statistical significant 
result between the corporation size and the voluntary disclosure can be also explained by the fact that larger 
firms feel more observed tend to increase the level of disclosure to keep their reputation and ensure their survival 
(Alivar, 2006). These facts make the companies willing to provide more information to the market. 
The second hypothesis in this study stating that there is a positive association between leverage and the 
extent of  voluntary disclosure in the Saudi publicly traded corporations is not supported by the our results. Table 
(5) shows no significant and negative relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure. This finding is not 
consistent with that results of other previous empirical studies (e. g. Barako, et al, 2006). This result does not 
support this study assumption that, in developing countries such as Saudi Arabia where financial institutions are 
a primary source of companies funds, there is an expectation that companies will disclose more information in 
their annual reports. 
The empirical evidence derived from the regression model results in Table (5) indicates that audit firm 
size is statistically related to the level of voluntary disclosure by the 116 publicly traded companies listed in the 
Saudi stock market (Tadawul) in their annual reports. However, the relationship is insignificant at .05% level. 
This finding approves no support to the third hypothesis in this study stating that there is a positive association 
between auditor size and the extent of  voluntary disclosure in the Saudi publicly traded corporations. This 
finding could be referred to the possibility that the role of auditors is limited to the boundaries of mandatory 
information and, auditors normally do not require their clients to report data in excess of that required by the 
accounting standards. The insignificance relationship found in this study between auditor size and voluntary 
disclosure is consistent with prior studies in both developed capital markets (e.g., Malone et al., 1993, Wallace et 
al., 1994; and Camfferman et al., 2002) and emerging capital markets (e.g., Chen et al., 2000; Haniffa et al., 
2002; Gul et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006; and Hossain et al., 2009). 
The fourth hypothesis in this study stating that there is a positive association between profitability and 
the extent of  voluntary disclosure in the Saudi publicly traded corporations is supported by the our results. This 
result suggests that the Saudi publicly traded companies that are profitable and their financial results are well 
tend to voluntarily disclose more information. The positive statistical significant relationship between 
profitability and the voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia is consistent with other studies in the literature (e.g., 
Meek et al., 1995; and Hossain et al.,2009). Wang et al., (2008) stated that as the firm’s earnings increase, 
managers have incentives to supply more information to the market in order to signal quality. 
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The fifth and last hypothesis in this study stating that there is a positive association between listing age and the 
extent of  voluntary disclosure in the Saudi publicly traded corporations is also supported by the results of this 
study as shown in Table (5). The coefficients are positive and significant at 0.05. This finding is not consistence 
with Haniffa et al (2002) in their findings since they found no significant association between listing age and 
voluntary disclosure. They explained this by saying that newly listed companies need to disclose more 
information to reduce skepticism and boost confidence of investors who may perceive them as more risky” 
(Haniffa et al, 2002). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to investigate the association between the voluntary disclosure level in annual 
reports and firm characteristics of more active 116 Saudi publicly traded corporations listed in the Saudi Stock 
Market (Tadawul) of the non-financial sector during the period 2012-2013. This study tried to extend previous 
research on the determinants of voluntary information disclosure in a unique information environment and a 
growing capital market, Saudi Arabia, which differs from those of developed countries in the fact that emerging 
markets have high-growth potential, relatively weak regulatory environment, weak corporate governance leading 
to expropriation of minority shareholders, and low information disclosure level causing high information gap 
between companies and investors. This study also utilized a comprehensive set of variables and tested five 
hypotheses to provide evidence regarding disclosure practices of Saudi Arabian companies. Thus, the study 
provides empirical evidence in relation to the effects of these variables on the voluntary information disclosure 
level. 
The present study has demonstrated that Saudi Arabian non-financial publicly traded firms’ disclosure 
level is at moderate level. A disclosure index was designed and tested for each firm. The study found that firms, 
on average, report 0.29 percent of the voluntary information. The low disclosure level most likely relates to the 
fact that this type of information is voluntary in nature, and no existing disciplines set out by the authoritative 
accounting and reporting bodies in Saudi Arabia require public firms to display such information. In other words, 
voluntary disclosure is left to the discretion of management. Further, in an effort to examine the relationship 
between the voluntary disclosure level and firm specific characteristics, the results of univariate and multivariate 
analyses indicated that corporation size, profitability, and listing age have significant positive association with 
voluntary disclosure level in annual reports. On the other hand, auditor size and leverage do not have any 
significant association with voluntary disclosure level. 
This study concludes in some important recommendations for companies, investors, and regulators in 
Saudi Arabia to improve the quality and reporting of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. Firms should 
increase voluntary information disclosure by being aware of advantages of information disclosure. Disclosure 
could enhance the confidence of their investors, satisfying their creditors and customers, improve their 
profitability and value of shares. Investors should demand higher disclosure from management and understand 
their right and companies obligations. Also, regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia are expected to guide firms toward 
the best practices of voluntary disclosures since firms look for such guidance. Also, the study provides empirical 
evidence to policy makers to improve the level of supervision, and to improve the standard of reporting in 
Bahrain in order to improve the acceptability of annual reports. They play a motivating role in this new era of 
information disclosure. Although the regulations of the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), particularly 
regarding corporate governance principles, contributed to the improvement of voluntary disclosure practices of 
the firms, there is a need to improve disclosure standard to higher levels. 
As with any research, this study has some limitations. The following limitations are the most pertinent. 
First, the items constituting the disclosure index were subjectively assembled from the Corporate Governance 
Regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority (CMA) pursuant to 
Resolution No. 1/212/2006, dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006) and compared to other prior 
studies. The choice of the items, however, does not reflect their level of importance as perceived by financial 
information users. Second, annual reports have been used as the sole source of data gathering, others such as web 
sites and press releases could be used in future studies. Finally, the findings may not be valid for non-listed 
companies. 
Future research may wish to enlarge the sample by including the financial industries or including 
unlisted companies. Furthermore, longitudinal studies covering several periods may reveal more substantial 
results and trends. Over time, the quality of disclosure might improve (Kanto et al, 1997). Gao et al, (2005) 
conducted a longitudinal research studies and indicated that information disclosure practices do change over time. 
Finally, this study used the annual reports of the Saudi companies as the main source for voluntary disclosure, 
other sources such as web sites, press releases, and prospectuses could be of interest. 
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APPENDIX (A) 
List of Saudi companies that traded shares on Saudi Arabian Stock Market in 2012 and 2013: 
Symbol Company name Short name Acronym 
Petrochemical Industries 
2330 Advanced Petrochemical Company Advanced Advanced 
2170 Alujain Corporation Alujain ALCO 
2001 Methanol Chemicals Company CHEMANOL CHEMANOL 
2210 Nama Chemicals Co. Nama Chemicals NAMA 
2060 National Industrialization Co. TASNEE NIC 
2002 National Petrochemical Company Petrochem Petrochem 
2380 Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical Co. Petro Rabigh PETRO RABIGH 
2260 Sahara Petrochemical Co. Petrochemical SPC 
2020 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers Co. SAFCO SAFCO 
2010 Saudi Basic Industries Corp SABIC SABIC 
2250 Saudi Industrial Investment Group SIIG SIIG 
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2310 Saudi International Petrochemical Co Sipchem SIPCHEM 
2350 Saudi Kayan Petrochemical Company Saudi Kayan KAYAN 
2290 Yanbu National Petrochemical Company YANSAB YANSAB 
Cement 
3091 AL JOUF CEMENT COMPANY Jouf Cement Jouf Cement 
3010 Arabian Cement Co ACC ARCCO 
3003 City Cement Co City Cement City Cement 
3080 Eastern Province Cement Co. EPCCO EACCO 
3001 Hail Cement Company HCC HCC 
3002 Najran Cement Company Najran Cement Najran Cement 
3004 Northern Region Cement Company Northern Cement Northern Cement 
3030 Saudi Cement Company. SCC SACCO 
3050 Southern Province Cement Co. spcc SOCCO 
3090 Tabuk Cement Co. TCC TACCO 
3040 The Qassim Cement Co QACCO QACCO 
3020 Yamama Cement Company YSCC YACCO 
3060 Yanbu Cement Co. YCC YNCCO 
Retail 
4001 Abdullah Al Othaim Markets Company A.Othaim Market A.OTHAIM MARKET 
4200 Aldrees Petroleum & Transport Services Co. Aldrees ALDREES 
4290 Alkhaleej Training and Education Company Alkhaleej Trng ALKHALEEJ TRNG 
4004 Dallah Healthcare Holding Company Dallah Health Dallah Health 
4240 Fawaz Abdulaziz AlHokair Company AlHokair ALHOKAIR 
4180 Fitaihi Holding Group Fitaihi Group AHFCO 
4190 Jarir Marketing Co Jarir Jarir 
4002 Mouwasat Medical Services Company Mouwasat Mouwasat 
4160 National Agriculture Marketing Co. THIMAR THIMAR 
4005 National Medical Care Company Care Care 
4050 Saudi Automotive Services Co. SASCO SASCO 
4006 Saudi Marketing Company Farm Superstore  
4003 United Electronics Company Extra Extra 
Energy & Utilities 
2080 National Gas & Industrialization Co. GASCO NGIC 
5110 Saudi Electricity Company Saudi Electric. SECO 
Agriculture & Food Industries 
6070 Al-Jouf Agriculture Development Co. ALJOUF JADCO 
2280 Almarai Company Almarai ALMARAI 
4061 Anaam International Holding Group CO. Anaam Holding ANAAM HOLDING 
6060 Ash-Sharqiyah Development Company Sharqiya Dev Co SHARQIYA DEV CO 
6080 Bishah Agriculture Development Co. BISHACO BISACO 
6001 Halwani Bros H B H B 
6002 Herfy Food Services Co Herfy Foods Herfy Foods 
6090 Jazan Development Co. JAZADCO GIZACO 
6010 National Agriculture Development Co. NADEC NADEC 
6020 Qassim Agriculture Co. GACO QAACO 
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6004 Saudi Airlines Catering Company Catering Catering 
6050 Saudi Fisheries Co. SFICO SFICO 
2270 Saudia Dairy and Foodstuff .Co SADAFCO SADAFCO 
2050 Savola Group Savola Group SAVOLA 
6040 Tabuk Agriculture Development Co. TADCO TAACO 
2100 WAFRAH FOR INDUSTRY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
WAFRAH FPCO 
Telecommunication & Information Technology 
7020 Etihad Etisalat Co. Etihad Etisalat EEC 
7030 Mobile Telecommunications Company Saudi 
Arabia 
ZAIN KSA ZAIN KSA 
7010 Saudi Telecom STC STC 
Multi-Investment 
2140 Al-Ahsa Development Co. ADC AADC 
4080 Aseer Trading, Tourism & Manufacturing Co. Aseer ATTMCO 
4280 Kingdom Holding Company Kingdom KINGDOM 
2120 Saudi Advanced Industries Co. SAIC SAICO 
2030 Saudi Arabia Refineries Co. SARCO SARCO 
2190 Saudi Industrial Services Co. SISCO SISCO 
Industrial Investment 
1214 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker SHAKER SHAKER 
1213 Al Sorayai Trading And Industrial Group 
Company 
AlSorayai Group AlSorayai 
2340 ALABDULLATIF INDUSTRIAL 
INVESTMENT CO. 
AlAbdullatif ALABDULLATIF 
1212 Astra Industrial Group Astra Indust ASTRA 
1210 Basic Chemical Industries Co BCI BCI 
2180 Filing and Packing Materials Manufacturing Co. FIPCO FIPCO 
2220 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Co. Maadaniyah NMMCC 
1211 Saudi Arabian Mining Company MAADEN MAADEN 
2230 Saudi Chemical Company SCC SCCO 
4140 Saudi Industrial Export Co SIECO SIECO 
2300 Saudi Paper Manufacturing Co. SPM SPM 
2070 Saudi Pharmaceutical Indust.& Med. Appliances 
Corp. 
SPIMACO SPIMACO 
1201 Takween Advanced Industries Takween Takween 
2150 The National Co. for Glass Industries Zoujaj ZOUJAJ 
Building & Construction 
1330 Abdullah A. M. Al-Khodari Sons Company ALKHODARI ALKHODARI 
2320 AL-BABTAIN POWER 
&TELECOMMUNICATION CO 
AL-BABTAIN AL BABTAIN 
2200 Arabian Pipes Company APC APCO 
1302 Bawan Company Bawan Bawan 
2370 Middle East Specialized Cables Co MESC MESC 
2090 National Gypsum Company NGC NGCO 
4230 Red Sea Housing Services Company Red Sea RED SEA HOUSING 
2160 Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co. Amiantit SAAC 
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2110 Saudi Cable Company SCC SCACO 
2040 Saudi Ceramic Co. Saudi Ceramics SCERCO 
2130 Saudi Industrial Development Co. SIDC SIDC 
1320 Saudi Steel Pipe Company SSP SSP 
2360 Saudi vitrified clay pipes co. SVCP SVCP 
1301 United Wire Factories Company ASLAK ASLAK 
2240 Zamil Industrial Investment Co Zamil Indust ZIIC 
Real Estate Development 
4150 Arriyadh Development Co. ARDCO ADCO 
4300 Dar Alarkan Real Estate Development Company Dar Al Arkan DAR AL ARKAN 
4220 Emaar The Economic City Emaar EC EMAAR THE 
ECONOMIC CITY 
4250 Jabal Omar Development Company Jabal Omar JABAL OMAR 
4310 Knowledge Economic City KEC KEC 
4100 Makkah Construction and Development Co. MCDC MCDCO 
4020 Saudi Real Estate Co. SRECO SRECO 
4090 Taiba Holding Co. Taiba TIRECO 
Transport 
4040 Saudi Public Transport Co. SAPTCO SAPTCO 
4110 Saudi Transport and Investment Company mubarrad SLTCO 
4030 The National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia Bahri Bahri 
4260 United International Transportation Company Ltd. Budget Saudi BUDGET SAUDI 
Media and Publishing 
4270 Saudi Printing and Packaging Company SPPC SPPC 
4210 Saudi Research and Marketing Group SRMG RESEARCH 
4070 Tihama Advertising & Public Relations Co. TAPRCO TAPRCO 
Hotel & Tourism 
1810 Al-Tayyar Travel Group Holding Co. ALTAYYAR ALTAYYAR 
4010 Saudi Hotels & Resort Areas Co. SHAR ِ◌ACO SHARCO 
4170 Tourism Enterprise Co. TECO TECO 
 
APPENDIX (B) 
List of Voluntary Disclosure Items 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to Information: 
(a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify the procedures and precautions that are 
necessary for the shareholders’ exercise of all their lawful rights. 
(b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their rights shall be made available and such 
information shall be comprehensive and accurate; it must be provided and updated regularly and within the 
prescribed times; the company shall use the most effective means in communicating with shareholders. No 
discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in relation to providing information. 
Article 5: Shareholders Rights Related to the General Assembly: 
(a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six months following the end of the 
company’s financial year. 
(b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall 
invite a General Assembly to convene pursuant to a request of the auditor or a number of shareholders whose 
shareholdings represent at least 5% of the equity share capital. 
(c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and announced by a notice, at least 20 
days prior to the date of the meeting; invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange’s website, the 
company’s website and in two newspapers of voluminous distribution in the Kingdom. Modern high tech means 
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shall be used in communicating with shareholders. 
(d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively participate and vote in the General Assembly; 
they shall be informed about the rules governing the meetings and the voting procedure. 
(e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the greatest number of shareholders in the 
General Assembly, including inter alia determination of the appropriate place and time. 
(f) In preparing the General Assembly’s agenda, the Board of Directors shall take into consideration matters 
shareholders require to be listed in that agenda; shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares 
are entitled to add one or more items to the agenda. upon its preparation. 
(g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of the General Assembly and raise 
relevant questions to the board members and to the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the external 
auditor shall answer the questions raised by shareholders in a manner that does not prejudice the company’s 
interest. 
(h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by sufficient information to enable 
shareholders to make decisions. 
(i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General Assembly; the company shall provide the 
Authority with a copy of those minutes within 10 days of the convening date of any such meeting. 
(j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the General Assembly. 
Article 6: Voting Rights: 
(a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in any way, be denied. The 
company must avoid taking any action which might hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder must be 
afforded all possible assistance as may facilitate the exercise of such right. 
(b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board members, the accumulative voting method 
shall be applied. 
(c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is not a board member and who is not an 
employee of the company to attend the General Assembly on his behalf. 
(d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - e.g. investment funds- shall disclose in 
their annual reports their voting policies, actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material conflict of 
interests that may affect the practice of the fundamental rights in relation to their investments. 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders: 
(a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding dividends, in a manner that may realize the 
interests of shareholders and those of the company; shareholders shall be informed of that policy during the 
General Assembly and reference thereto shall be made in the report of the Board of Directors. 
(b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of distribution. These dividends, whether 
they be in cash or bonus shares shall be given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the records kept at 
the Securities Depository Center as they appear at the end of trading session on the day on which the General 
Assembly is convened. 
Article 9: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report: 
(a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the provisions which have not been 
implemented, and the justifications for not implementing them. 
(b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the company Board of Directors member acts as a 
member of its Board of directors. 
(c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its members as follows: executive board member, 
non-executive board member, or independent board member. 
(d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board’s main committees such as the Audit 
Committee, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their chairmen, 
names of their members, and the aggregate of their respective meetings. 
(e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid. 
(f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the company by the Authority or any other 
supervisory or regulatory or judiciary body. 
(g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control procedures of the company. 
Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors: 
(a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and supervising their implementation. 
(b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them. 
(c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not contradict the provisions of this 
regulation, supervising and monitoring in general the effectiveness of the code and amending it whenever 
necessary. 
(d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for the membership of the Board of 
Directors and implementing them after they have been approved by the General Assembly. 
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(e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting their 
respective rights. 
(f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company’s compliance with the laws and regulations and the 
company’s obligation to disclose material information to shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. 
Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board: 
(a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the company’s Board of Directors shall 
assume all the necessary powers for the company’s management. The ultimate responsibility for the company 
rests with the Board even if it sets up committees or delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of 
Directors shall avoid issuing general or indefinite power of attorney. 
(b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the company’s Articles of Association. 
(c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in good faith and with due 
diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient information from the executive management, or from any 
other reliable source. 
(d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he undertakes to carry out whatever may be 
in the general interest of the company, but not the interests of the group he represents or that which voted in 
favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors. 
(e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to the executive management and the 
procedures for taking any action and the validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters reserved for 
decision by the Board of Directors. The executive management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic 
reports on the exercise of the delegated powers. 
(f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for orienting the new board members of the 
company’s business and, in particular, the financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, where 
necessary. 
(g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about the company is made available to all 
members of the Board of Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, to enable them 
to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an effective manner. 
(h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which spans more than three years, and shall 
not sell or mortgage real estate of the company, or drop the company’s debts, unless it is authorized to do so by 
the company’s Articles of Association. In the case where the company’s Articles of Association includes no 
provisions to this respect, the Board should not act without the approval of the General Assembly, unless such 
acts fall within the normal scope of the company’s business. 
Article 12: Formation of the Board: 
(a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number of the Board of Directors members, 
provided that such number shall not be less than three and not more than eleven. 
(b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of Directors for the duration provided for in 
the Articles of Association of the company, provided that such duration shall not exceed three years. Unless 
otherwise provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, members of the Board may be reappointed. 
(c) The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-executive members. 
(d) It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors with any other executive 
position in the company, such as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general 
manager. 
(e) The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less than two members, or one-third of the 
members, whichever is greater. 
(f) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner in which membership of the Board of 
Directors terminates. At all times, the General Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members of the Board of 
Directors even though the Articles of Association provide otherwise. 
(g) On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways of termination, the company shall 
promptly notify the Authority and the Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination. 
(h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the Board of Directors of more than five 
joint stock companies at the same time. 
(i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company’s Articles of Association to appoint representatives in the 
Board of Directors, is not entitled to nomination vote of other members of the Board of Directors. 
Article 13: Committees of the Board: 
(a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with the company’s requirements and 
circumstances, in order to enable the Board of Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner. 
(b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors shall be according to general procedures 
laid down by the Board, indicating the duties, the duration and the powers of each committee, and the manner in 
which the Board monitors its activities. The committee shall notify the Board of its activities, findings or 
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decisions with complete transparency. The Board shall periodically pursue the activities of such committees so as 
to ensure that the activities entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall approve the by-
laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter alia, the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee. 
(c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors shall be appointed in 
committees that are concerned with activities that might involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the 
integrity of the financial and non-financial reports, reviewing the deals concluded by related parties, nomination 
to membership of the Board, appointment of executive directors, and determination of remuneration. 
Article 14: Audit Committee: 
(a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the “Audit Committee”. Its members shall not 
be less than three, including a specialist in financial and accounting matters. Executive board members are not 
eligible for Audit Committee membership. 
(b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of Directors, issue rules 
for appointing the members of the Audit Committee and define the term of their office and the procedure to be 
followed by the Committee. 
(c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee. 
Article 15: Nomination and Remuneration Committee: 
(a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named “Nomination and Remuneration Committee”. 
(b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of Directors, issue rules for the 
appointment of the members of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, terms of office and the procedure 
to be followed by such committee. 
(c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board. 
Article 17: Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members. 
Article 18: Conflict of Interest Within the Board. 
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